The Pahalgam Response: Not a Ceasefire, Only a Tactical Pause
In his The Strategy of Conflict (originally published in 1960; republished by Harvard University Press in 1981) Nobel laureate economist Thomas Schelling had talked of strategy as the setting up of a broader goal or objective by an actor that the actor then tries to achieve through a series of immediate actions. These actions can be both defensive (ability to resist an attack by the enemy) and offensive (ability to retaliate punitively against an enemy, including sometimes pre-emptive and unpredictable actions) in orientation. The broader goal that the actor sets up and the course of actions an actor will choose in trying to achieve the goal will also depend significantly on what the actor’s enemy chooses to do. Following Schelling, one can argue that the goal of military operations is mainly political in the sense that it sets up the parameters of acceptable future behavior from the enemy. In other words, through military operations, an actor signals to the enemy what it is allowed or not allowed to do; and military actions are designed to deliver or signal this message to the enemy by inflicting great pain or cost for non-compliance. The enemy’s resistance and counteraction capability and choices will significantly affect the course of military operations that an actor will choose from a range of options.
Using this approach, one can try and piece together India’s approach towards Pakistan in the wake of the Pahalgam terror attack of 22 April 2025. On that fateful day, in a meadow in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), 26 Hindu tourists (all men) were systematically executed by Islamist terrorists belonging to The Resistance Front (TRF), a front organization for the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) in the Kashmir Valley. The terrorists first asked the victims to identify their religion by reciting the Kalima (declaration of faith, specifically the Shahada, which most Hindus will not know) and then confirmed their Hindu faith by checking their genitalia (to confirm that the men were not circumcised); thus confirmed, the victims were then shot execution style in front of their families. The terrorists then told the surviving family members that their lives were being spared so that they could “go and tell Modi”, the Indian Prime Minister.
India’s Initial Non-Kinetic Response
As the Modi government went into an emergency huddle to discuss how India should respond to this terror attack, two things became obvious very soon. One, that this was a LET attack; after all, the TRF is an LET affiliate in the Kashmir Valley. The Indian security forces also found out that of the five or six terrorists who carried out the attack in Pahalgam, several had crossed over from Pakistan. And two, that the attack seemed to have the fingerprints of General Asim Munir, the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan. A few days before the attack, General Munir had given a hate filled speech against Hindus and India in Pakistan before an overseas-based Pakistani community. His speech served as a dog whistle to terror groups to launch the Pahalgam attack.
The Modi government took a few immediate non-kinetic measures against Pakistan. The government announced that it was putting in abeyance the Indus Water Treaty, which would allow upper riparian India to restrict and divert the flow of river waters into lower riparian Pakistan. The government also ordered the immediate cancellation of all visas (except for long-stay visas) issued to Pakistani nationals and asked the state governments to ensure their deportation within 48 hours. India additionally declared several members of the Pakistan High Commission in India to be persona non grata and reduced the overall strength of the High Commission to only 30 staff; it also recalled Indian diplomats from Pakistan. The Modi government reciprocated Pakistan’s decision to close its airspace to Indian commercial aircraft by banning flights to Pakistan over Indian airspace. The Modi government further banned Pakistani television, OTT, and YouTube channels from India. India also mounted a diplomatic campaign to share classified information about the Pahalgam attack and Pakistan’s direct involvement in it with important states and global institutions. The aim of the diplomatic outreach was to build a strong moral and legal case (right of self-defense) for kinetic operations aimed at terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan.
India’s Kinetic Response: Operation Sindoor
From the available evidence so far, it appears that India’s top leadership focused on two core objectives that required delivering a kinetic response to Pakistan. First, India wanted to send a message to the various terror groups in Pakistan that terror attacks in India will not go unpunished and India will inflict significant pain on them for bad behavior. Second, India wanted to send a clear message to the Pakistan Army/ISI to move away from using non-state terrorism against India to make India “bleed from a thousand cuts”; the pain for non-compliance will be significant and Pakistan’s status as a nuclear weapon state will not deter India from taking major military offensive action against Pakistan inside Pakistan. In other words, the objective of India’s kinetic response was to induce, intimidate, and compel a change in behavior from two sets of actors in Pakistan: the terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HUM), and the Pakistani Army/ISI. In this calculus, the civilian government in Pakistan was of no consequence since all major decisions are taken by the Army/ISI. Therefore, sending a strong signal to the Generals was most important.
Between May 8 to May 11, India’s kinetic operations went through three distinct phases of escalation. The military operations started with attacks on nine terror camps, headquarters, and operational bases belonging to the LET, the JEM, and the HUM located in Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Bahawalpur, Rawalakot, Chakswari, Bhimber, Neelum Valley, Jhelum, and Chakwal. Of these targets, four were located inside Pakistan proper. The remaining five were located in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Of particular significance were two targets: Markaz Subhan Allah at Bahawalpur (Jaish-e-Muhammed HQ) and Markaz Taiba in Muridke (Lashkar-e-Taiba HQ). These targets were hit by the Indian military mostly by using attack drones and missiles fired from fighter aircraft. Army units launched loitering Kamikaze drones and ‘smart’ extended range artillery shells at the targets based on credible intelligence inputs. A combination of Rafale, Mirage-2000, and Sukhoi-30MKI fighters were also used to hit the targets with long-range missiles and ‘smart’ glide bombs. The fighter aircrafts were supported by AEW&C (airborne early warning and control) aircraft, which acted as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the operation. It is unclear whether the Indian fighter aircrafts entered Pakistani airspace to carry out these attacks; most likely they fired their missiles from Indian side of the LOC and the IB. The destruction caused to these targets was significant. It has been reported that over a hundred terrorists died in these attacks, including JEM’s Abdul Rauf Azhar who was the mastermind behind the assassination of Daniel Pearl, the Jewish-American journalist from The Wall Street Journal. Several family members of LET Chief, Hafiz Saeed, were also reported to have been killed in these attacks. Overall, the initial attacks, by targeting terrorist camps, training centers, and launch pads eroded the terrorist groups’ capability to launch attacks inside India. For the Pakistan Army/ISI, the loss of these non-state military assets was significant and eroded their ability to conduct sub-conventional war against India, at least for some time.
Pakistan did not heed the ‘signals’ from the initial Indian attack. The Pakistan Army/ISI responded to this initial Indian attack in two ways. First, Islamabad resorted to major violations of the ceasefire agreement across the LOC in J&K. The ceasefire agreement, worked out during COAS General Bajwa’s time, had kept peace across the LOC in J&K. But now, after Pakistan rejected the 1972 Shimla Agreement (which marked the LOC) and the ceasefire agreement, the LOC became intensely ‘hot’ as Indian forces were given a free hand to return fire. Pakistani artillery firing across the LOC were deliberately directed at civilian targets (homes and places of worship), which killed a number of civilians. This was a violation of the laws of warfare, which under the Geneva protocols expressly forbids military forces from targeting civilian homes, hospitals and places of worship.
Pakistani heavy firing on Indian forward posts led to the deaths of several Indian soldiers. Intense return fire from India destroyed several Pakistani forward posts and the Indian Army estimated that around 35-40 Pakistani soldiers may have died. Secondly, and more dangerously as an escalation step, Pakistan launched aerial attacks across the LOC in J&K and the IB in Jammu, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. On the night of 8th and 9th May, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched mass scale drone, UAV, and fighter aircraft attacks on India. The main targets were largely Indian military installations and logistics systems; the purpose of the aerial attacks could also be to test Indian air defense systems and identify vulnerable spots. These attacks were unsuccessful and repelled by the S400 and Akash air defense systems. It was reported that India had shot down two PAF JF-17 fighter jets, and a F-16 jet. DGISPR in Pakistan confirmed the loss of two JF-17 fighters but there is no firm word yet on the F-16 jet.
India’s response began the second phase of the kinetic operations and marked a major escalation. During this phase (on the night of the 8th, 9th, and 10th May), India targeted Pakistan’s surveillance radar installations and air defense systems. Surveillance radar sites at Lahore and Gujranwala were destroyed. There were also reports that radar and air defense systems located at Karachi port may have been hit. Other military installations were targeted to degrade Pakistan’s ISR capability. In hitting these targets, India had to be extremely cautious since Pakistan had deliberately allowed civilian aircraft to fly out of Lahore airport.
Pakistan still did not heed India’s warning signal, which had been carefully calibrated to minimize major damage to military and civilian areas. In a major escalatory step, the Pakistani leadership announced the launch of Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos or Iron Wall/Firm Foundation to counter India’s Operation Sindoor. As part of this new escalation, the PAF fired a series of drones and missiles at India. It was claimed by Pakistan that several Fatah-II missiles had been fired at hard military targets in India (most likely a BrahMos missile storage facility in Beas and airbases Udhampur, Adampur, and Pathankot); Indian authorities have not yet confirmed this. One Fatah-II missile was also reported to have been fired at India’s capital, Delhi; this missile was intercepted by India’s air defence systems over Haryana’s Sirsa. The Fatah-II is a surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a range of around 400 kilometres that can be meshed with either conventional or nuclear warheads. The firing of this missile was a significant step up the vertical escalation ladder. It began to ring alarm bells within the Indian government, particularly also because some Pakistani leaders were talking ominously about exercising their nuclear weapons option.
This set into motion a spectacular escalatory move by India. In a pre-dawn operation on the night of May 10th, India launched major precision strikes on eleven military sites and air bases across Pakistan: Nur Khan (Chaklala), Rafiqui, Murid, Sukkur, Sialkot, Pasrur, Chunian, Sargodha, Skardu, Bholari, and Jacobabad. These sites were chosen for their operational importance, including command and control centres, air defence nodes, technical infrastructure, radar sites, weapon storage areas, and aircraft deployment hubs. Of particular significance was the attack on the Nur Khan air base in Chaklala, near Rawalpindi. This air base is home to Pakistan's main transport aircrafts such as the C-130 Hercules (vital for logistical and airlift operations) and IL-78 mid-air refuelers. The base is also in close proximity to the headquarters of the Strategic Plans Division, the body that oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Satellite images also indicated a strike on the runway of Mushaf airbase in Sargodha. There were also reports (unconfirmed as of now) that precision strikes with BrahMos, Spice2000, and loitering bunker penetrating munitions were carried out on underground nuclear storage facilities under the Kirana Hills in close proximity to the Mushaf airbase. These strikes were meant to send a strong signal to Pakistan: that India was capable of destroying their strategic assets and offensive weapons systems if they decided to escalate the conflict further.
De-escalation: Three Hypotheses
India’s precision air strikes on the eleven military sites and airbases across Pakistan created a flurry of activities across continents that eventually led to a cessation of hostilities late night on May 10th and into May 11th. What led to this de-escalation? The fog of war has not lifted fully yet, so it is hard to give a definitive answer to this question. But three alternative hypotheses can be put forward on the issue.
First, one can argue that India’s deep strikes, initially on terrorist headquarters and later on Pakistani military sites, airbases, and ISR installations caused a lot of damage. It was reported that over hundred terrorists died or were gravely injured in the initial attack on the nine terrorist camps and training facilities. We are also now hearing of the massive damage to the military sites and airbases, including significant loss of lives. Although this information is mostly coming out of military briefings given by India, there has not been any strong categorical denial offered by Pakistan. Given Pakistan’s dire economic situation, its inability to attract strong international support, and the devastating military damages and losses that the Pakistan military has suffered means Pakistan had no options left but to appeal for de-escalation, which was also not against India strategic objective.
Second, India has proved in this conflict that its air defence (AD) systems are robust and capable of neutralizing aerial threats (drones, missiles, etc.) from Pakistan. The AD systems were able to neutralize the Pakistani aerial threats from drones, missiles, and fighter jets; moreover, the AD systems brought down at least two J17 fighters and possibly one F16 fighter jet. Add to this the fact that India had through the precision strikes taken out most of Pakistan’s ISR capability. The strikes on the airbases and military installations were devastating, perhaps severely compromising Pakistan’s ability to escalate to nuclear missile launch that was the only option left. This probably influenced Pakistan to seek de-escalation.
Finally, there are reports now trickling out that the Indian missile strikes on the nuclear weapons storage facility located under the Kirana Hills close to the Mushaf airbase in Sargodha may have caused significant damage to the nuclear warheads and perhaps created some radiation contamination at the location. There were reports, particularly on social media platforms, that a special aircraft belonging to the United States Department of Energy had landed in Islamabad; this plane supposedly can help detect the extent of the radiation contamination. There were further reports that an Egyptian aircraft had been seen heading to Pakistan carrying boron (found in plenty in Egypt), which is used to mop up radiation leaks. If these developments turn out to be accurate, then Pakistan has a serious problem on its hands and is in no position to escalate. It therefore desperately dialled the United States and China and sought their intervention with India in order to de-escalate.
Which hypothesis is closer to the truth (perhaps all three are in some degree) is hard to tell at this juncture. However, as I write this, there came reports of an earthquake of magnitude 4.6 scale hitting Pakistan at 1:26 PM Indian Standard Time on May 12th, 2025. The epicentre of this ‘earthquake’ seems not too far from Sargodha. Could it be possible that India’s BrahMos and Spice2000 missiles hit the nuclear weapons storage sites so hard that some of the nuclear warheads are exploding deep beneath the surface?
Conclusion: Ceasefire or Tactical Pause?
It is now becoming clear that on the 10th of May, Pakistan reached out to the United States and China to seek their help to de-escalate this crisis with India. Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Doval spoke to US Secretary of State Rubio and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. US Vice President Vance then called Prime Minister Modi and had a lengthy discussion with him. It was reported that PM Modi agreed to pause the military operations on one condition: if any future terror attacks on India take place from Pakistani soil, India will consider it to be an act of war and reduce Pakistan to rubble. The parameters thus established, India advised the US and China to convey to Pakistan that the Pakistani Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) should directly contact his Indian counterpart and initiate the discussions that would lead to a de-escalation and halt to hostilities. After a brief hiccup, from late night on May 10th, the firing stopped.
Was this really a ceasefire agreement? I do not think so for the simple reason that a ceasefire requires a formal agreement between two sides who are both capable of fighting but choose not to do so, which is not the case here. After the Indian precision strikes on Pakistani military sites and airbases, Pakistan is not in a position to wage war and attack India; hence, the only option available to Islamabad is to stop fighting. This is certainly not the case as far as India is concerned. In fact, critics of Mr Modi are absolutely roasting him for not going for the jugular when the enemy is down and out.
So, why did Mr Modi agree to halt hostilities? My argument is that what Mr Modi has agreed to is a tactical pause. India will wait and watch but forces will be on high alert and hit Pakistan hard if any terror attack on India is launched by groups based in Pakistan and backed by the Pakistani Army/ISI. In other words, India will remain steadfast behind the two core objectives mentioned earlier: (a) terror attacks in India will not go unpunished and India will inflict significant pain on terror groups for bad behavior; and (b) Pakistan Army/ISI must move away from using non-state terrorism against India; the pain for non-compliance will be significant and Pakistan’s status as a nuclear weapon state will not deter India from taking offensive military actions. What those actions may entail was vividly demonstrated during the current crisis. If anything, future military actions could be even more devastating.
Mr. Modi’s approval of tough military actions against Pakistan in the wake of the Pahalgam attack has also helped India to overcome a huge psychological phobia – the fear to attack a nuclear armed Pakistan and make it pay it for its malafide behavior. For almost 5 decades, Pakistani leaders had come to believe that nuclear weapons gave them the license to carry out nefarious and subversive activities in neighboring states with impunity. Every time a neighboring state thought of taking action, Islamabad would rattle the nuclear saber hard and Western states would come running in to diffuse the situation and bail Pakistan out. Mr. Modi is the first Indian leader who has called Pakistan’s bluff. He authorized the cross-LOC raid after the Uri attack in 2016; he then authorized the Balakot air strike after the Pulwama massacre in 2019; and he has authorized major kinetic operations in the wake of Pahalgam. The Indian military strikes this time has seriously degraded Pakistan’s military capability and this should make Islamabad cautious. The Pakistani generals surely know now that the next time they do any mischief against India, the Indian military will come hard at them. Who knows, but Mr. Modi’s strategic objective next time around could be to dismember Pakistan altogether.
Rajat Ganguly is the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs (Sage) and Journal of World Affairs: Voice of the Global South (Sage). He is also a faculty member of the Global Security program at Murdoch University, Western Australia. He received his PhD in Political Science from Tulane University (US) and has held academic positions at Murdoch University (Australia), the University of East Anglia (UK), Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand), the University of Southern Mississippi (US), Tulane University (US), and the University of West Florida (US). He has also been a Visiting Research Fellow at McGill University (Canada). He is a member of the editorial boards of the Journal of South Asian Development, South Asian Survey, Journal of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Journal of Law and Policy, and the Journal of North-East Indian Studies. He specializes in international relations and international security, particularly great power politics and interstate war, ethnic conflict and insurgency movements, terrorism and political violence, Indian foreign and security policy, and Asian international and strategic affairs. He is the author/editor of several books, and his articles have appeared in scholarly journals such as Small Wars and Insurgencies, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Third World Quarterly, Asian Studies Review, Strategic Analysis, and India Quarterly.
